CHAPTER XVI, Section 299-311 of INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC) – OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY

Of Offences affecting Life.

299. Culpable homicide.

Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

Illustrations-
(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.

Bare Acts

(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it A, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.

(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is behind a bush; A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.

Explanation I-
A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.

Explanation 2-
Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.

Explanation 3-
The causing of the death of child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.

COMMENTS
(i)Culpable homicide” is genus, and “murder” is the specie. All “murder” is culpable homicide but not vice-versa;
Narasingh Challan v. State of Orissa, (1997) 2 Crimes 78 (Ori)

(ii) The assault for murder cannot be said to be sudden and without meditation as the deceased was not armed;
State of Maharashtra v. Krishna Murti Lazmipatti Naidu, AIR 1981

300. Murder.

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
Secondly- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or
Thirdly- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or
Fourthly- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Illustrations-
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.

(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.

(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.

Exception 1-
When culpable homicide is not murder- 
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above exception is subject to the following provisos-

First- That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

Secondly- That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

Thirdly- That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation-
Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

Illustrations-
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills. Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.

(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.

(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.

(d) A appears as witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.

(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.

Exception 2-
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Illustration-
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.

Exception 3-
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.

Exception 4-
Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation-
It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Exception 5-
Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.

Illustration-
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

COMMENTS
(i) In case where there was no intention to cause death, the act was done with knowledge that same is likely to cause death, the guilt of offence comes under part II of sec. 304;
S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat, (1991)

(ii) In absence of intention to cause particular injury likely to cause death conviction comes under part II of sec. 304;
Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55 (1981) Cr LR (SC) 543: (1981) 4 SCC 484.

(iii) When there was no evidence as to how death came about, evidence relating to charge of murder was held to be insufficient and unacceptable;
Kedar Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1991) Cr LJ 989 (SC)

(iv) When in case of murder complaint filed after a month of incident and witnesses, statement recorded after 9 months, conviction cannot be founded;
State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1917: (1981) Cr LJ 1683: (1981) SCC (Cr) 782 : (1981) Cr LR (SC) 501 : (1981) 4 SCC 2

(v) Circumstances that accused were in possession of buffaloes belonging to deceased cannot lead to hold accused guilty of murder;
Joga Gola v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 SC 1227: (1982) SCC (Cr) 141.

(vi) When accused had no intention to cause injury on non-vital part of body which was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature, illustration (c) of section 300 is not applicable;
Gokul Parashram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1441: (1981) Cr LJ 1033.

(vii) The totality of the injuries caused to the victim clearly supports the finding of both the courts below that the accused/appellants went on belabouring the deceased till he died on the spot. In the circumstances, the contention that the accused did not intend to cause the murder of the deceased cannot be upheld by the Supreme Court;
Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1991) Cr LJ 1373 (1373-1374) (SC)

(viii) Having regard to the number of injuries inflicted on the deceased it was not possible to uphold the contention that there was no intention to kill;
Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1991) Cr LJ 1373 (1373-1374) (SC)

(ix) The establishment of the involvement of the accused on the incident and misgiving of a barchhi blow to the grandson of the deceased when he tried to go to the rescue of his grand-father, is sufficient to convict the accused under section 300 read with section 34;
Banta Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) Cr LJ 1342 (SC)

(x) It is fallacious to contend that when death is caused by a single blow clause thirdly is not attracted and, therefore, it would not amount to murder. The ingredient ‘intention’ in that clause gives clue in a given case whether offence involved is murder or not;
Jai Prakash v. The State (Delhi Administration), (1991) 1 Crimes 474 (SC)

(xi) The number and nature of injuries may furnish good evidence to consider whether the accused had exceeded the right to private defence;
Patori Devi v. Amar Nath, (1988) Cr LJ 836: AIR 1988 SC 560

(xii) Circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to convict accused when possibility of deceased receiving fatal injury by fall cannot be ruled out;
State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kamla, (1991) Cr LJ 602 (SC)

(xiii) In case of murder in which the conclusion of guilt is drawn by prosecution it must be fully established beyond all reasonable doubt and consistent with the guilt of the accused;
S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat, (1991) Cr LJ 330 (SC)

(xiv) Infliction of the injury on the vital part of the body with the agricultural instrument by the enraged accused in a sudden quarrel—Held, accused did not cause the injury intentionally;
Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1150

(xv) (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
(2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence.
Venkatesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 3 Crimes 146 (Mad)

(xvi) Mere sudden quarrel would not entitle the accused to seek for Exception 4 to section 300;
Samuthram alias Samudra Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 Crimes 185 (Mad)

(xvii) To invoke Exception 4 to section 300, four requirements must be satisfied, namely
(i) it was a sudden fight;
(ii) there was no premeditation;
(iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and
(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage 
or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this Exception provided he has not acted cruelly;
Samuthram alias Samudra Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 Crimes 185 (Mad)

(xviii) Where a mutual conflict develops and there is no reliable and acceptable evidence as to how it started and as to who was the aggressor, it will not be correct to assume private defence for both sides. Such a case will be a case of sudden fight and conflict and has to be dealt with under Exception 4 to section 300 of the Code;
Anuram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997) 2 Crimes 582 (MP)

301. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.

If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.

COMMENTS
Accused is punishable for murder under doctrine of transfer of malice under section 301 of the Code when he aimed at one and killed another person;
Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) Cr LJ 597 (SC)

302. Punishment for murder.

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Death, or imprisonment for life, and fine—Cognizable—Non- bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS
(i) When ocular evidence in murder case is unreliable benefit of doubt to be given to all accused; Chandu Bhai Shana Bhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 SC 1022 : (1981) SCC (Cr) 682

(ii) The facts taken cumulatively form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the murder was committed by the appellant and none else;
Daya Ram v. The State (Delhi Administration, (1988) Cr LJ 865: AIR 1988 SC 615.

(iii) Provisions of death sentence being an alternative punishment for murder is not unreasonable; Bachhan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898: (1980) 2 SCC 864: (1980) Cr LJ 636 : (1980) Cr LR (SC) 388: 1980 (2) SCJ 475

(iv) In case where facts and circumstances from which conclusion of guilt was sought to be drawn by prosecution was not established beyond reasonable doubt the conviction under section 302 read with section 34 and under section 392 had to be quashed;
Hardyal and Prem v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) Cr LJ 345 (SC)

(v) Accused committed murder in professional manner with planned motivation, accused deserved no sympathy even when the accused had no personal motive;
Kuljeet Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1572: (1981) Cr LJ 1045: (1981) Cr LR (SC) 328

(vi) In dowry deaths motive for murder exists and what is required of Courts is to examine as to who translated it into action as motive viz., whether individual or family;
Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 1 Crimes 116 (SC)

Law Notes

(vii) Crime of murder committed against public servant doing official duties must be discouraged and dealt with firm hand;
Gayasi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1160: (1981) ALJ 441: (1981) Cr LJ 883: (1981) SCC (Cr) 590: (1981) Cr App. R (SC) 385: (1981) 2 SCC 713

(viii) Fatal injury caused by the accused in broad day light, evidence of the eye witness and medical evidence being corroborative, conviction under section 302, held, sustainable;
Wazir Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 1429

(ix) It is well settled that if the evidence of the eye-witnesses are held to be reliable and inspire confidence then the accused cannot be acquitted solely on the ground that some superficial injuries found on the person of the accused concerned, had not been explained by the prosecution;
A.M. Kunnikoya v. State of Kerala, 1993 (1) Crimes 1192 (SC)

(x) Conviction can be based on testimony of a single eye witness provided his testimony is found reliable and inspires confidence;
Anil Phukan v. State of Assam, 1993 (1) Crimes 1180 (SC)

(xi) When the appellant dealt a severe knife blow on the stomach of deceased without provocation and when deceased was unarmed and had already been injured by co-accused the appellant cannot be held that he had no intention to cause a murderous assault by mere fact that only one blow was inflicted; Nashik v. State of Maharashtra, 1993(1) Crimes 1197 (SC)

(xii) In cases depending on circumstantial evidence it is true that the chain of events proved by the prosecution must show that within all human probability the offence has been committed by the accused, but the court is expected to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts along with the motive suggested by the prosecution which induced the accused to follow a particular path;
Sarbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993(1) Crimes 616 (SC)

(xiii) Non-explanation of the injuries on the person of the accused by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case if the injuries sustained by the accused are minor or superficial or where the evidence produced by the prosecution is clear and cogent and is of independent and dis-interested persons and is consistent with credit worthiness;
Sawai Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 2 crimes 148 (Raj)

(xiv) Two offences under section 302 and section 306 of the Indian Penal Code are of distinct and different categories;
Sangarabonia Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 4 Supreme 214.

(xv) The basic constituent of an offence under section 302, is homicidal death;
Sangarabonia Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 4 Supreme 214.

303. Punishment for murder by life-convict.

Whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life, commits murder, shall be punished with death.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Death—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session— Non-compoundable.

304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Para I: Punishment—Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non- compoundable.

Para II: Punishment—Imprisonment for 10 years, or fine, or both—Cognizable— Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS
(i) Before an accused is held guilty and punished under first part or second part of section 304 a death must have been caused by the assailant under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to section 300;
Harendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar, 1993(1) Crimes 984 (SC)

(ii) Out of the three accused persons, one of the accused person gave a fatal blow on the head of the deceased, the other accused person injured the deceased by spear on his knee and arm. First accused person is liable to be convicted under part I of section 304. The other accused person is liable to be convicted under section 324 as section 34 has not been applied after setting aside conviction under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code;
Kedar Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1992 SC 1629

(iii) Where there was absence of prior enmity with deceased and intention accused was sentenced under section 304, part II and not under section 302;
Rajju v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1994) Cr LJ 105 (All)

(iv) Whether the plea of drunkenness can be taken as defence for claiming acquittal or for lessening sentence depends upon ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ of the accused;
Mirza Ghani Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 2 Crimes 19 (AP)

304A. Causing death by negligence.

Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both—Cognizable—Bailable— Triable by Magistrate of the first class—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS
In order to impose criminal liability on the accused, it must be found as a fact that collusion was entirely or mainly due to the rashness or negligence;
Munile Sao v. State of Bihar (1997) 3 Crimes 200 (Pat)

304B. Dowry Death.

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death“, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation-
For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Imprisonment of not less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session— Non-compoundable.

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COMMENTS
Section 304B is a substantive provision creating a new offence and not merely a provision effecting a change in procedure for trial of a pre-existing substantive offence. As a consequence, accused cannot be tried and punished for the offence of dowry death provided in section 304B of the Code with the minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for an act done by them prior to creation of the new offence of dowry death;
Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, 1991 Cr LJ (313) (SC)

305. Abetment of suicide of child or insane person.

If any person under eighteen years of age, any insane person, any delirious person, any idiot, or any person in a state of intoxication, commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Death, or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non- compoundable.

306. Abetment of suicide.

If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable— Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS
(i) To attract the ingredients of abetment, the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide is necessary;
Pallem Deniel Victoralions Victor Manter & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 1 Crimes 499 (AP)

(ii) Two offences under section 302 and section 306 of the Indian Penal Code are of distinct and different categories;
Sangarabonia Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 4 Supreme 214.

(iii) The basic constituents of an offence under section 306, IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof;
Sangarabonia Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 4 Supreme 214.

307. Attempt to murder.

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty or murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by life convicts- When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.

Illustrations-
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.

(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensure.

(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.

(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Para I:
Punishment—Imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

Para II: Punishment—Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non- compoundable.
Para III: Punishment—Death, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine— Cognizable—Non—bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS
(i) If a person who does an act with intention or knowledge that if by that act caused death, he will be guilty of murder;
Vasant Virthu Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 2 Crimes 539 (Bom)

(ii) The question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of section 307, is a question of fact and not one of law. It would all depend on the facts of a given case;
Vasant Virthu Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 2 Crimes 539 (Bom)

(iii) The important thing to be borne in mind in determining the question whether an offence under section 307, is made out is the intention and not the injury (even if simple or minor);
Vasant Virthu Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 2 Crimes 539 (Bom)

(iv) It is not necessary that injury, capable of causing death, should have been inflicted. What is material to attract, the provisions of section 307 is the guilty intention or knowledge with which the all was done, irrespective of its result. The intention and knowledge are the matters of inference from totality of circumstances and cannot be measured merely from the results;
Ansarudin v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997) 2 Crimes 157 (MP)

(v) The intention of knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder;
Hari Kishan and State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh, (1989) Cr LJ 116: AIR 1988 SC 2127.

(vi) When in the absence of intention accused fired shot causing simple injury to victim, conviction under Section 324 instead of under section 307 justified;
Kundan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 62

(vii) When only one accused out of six being members of unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapon fired shots causing injuries falling under section 307, conviction under section 307 justified;
Tukaram Dayamu Gurav v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 59: (1982) Cr LJ 199

308. Attempt to commit culpable homicide.

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

Illustration-
A, on grave and sudden provocation, fires a pistol at Z, under such circumstances that if he thereby caused death he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Para I:
Punishment—Imprisonment for 3 years, or fine, or both—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

Para II: Punishment—Imprisonment for 7 years, or fine, or both Cognizable—Non- Bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

309. Attempt to commit suicide.

Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall he punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Simple imprisonment for 1 year, or fine or both—Cognizable— Bailable—Triable by any Magistrate—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS
The Supreme Court has set aside its earlier judgment in P. Rathinam/ Nagbhushan Patnaik v. Union of India, JT 1994 (3) SC 392, wherein the Court had struck down section 309 as unconstitutional. In a country where one-half of its population still live below the poverty line, the right to die by suicide cannot be granted to any person. Article 21 of the Constitution, which gives right to life and personal liberty, by no stretch of imagination can be said to impliedly include right to death by committing suicide. The section is also not violative of Article 14. There is no requirement of awarding any minimum sentence. The sentence of imprisonment or fine is not compulsory but discretionary;
Smt. Gian Kaur v. The State of Punjab, JT 1996 (3) SC 339.

310. Thug.

Whoever, at any time after the passing of this Act, shall have been habitually associated with any other or others for the purpose of committing robbery or child- stealing by means of or accompanied with murder, is a thug.

311. Punishment.

Whoever is a thug, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE
Punishment—Imprisonment for life and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

Chapter XVI is lengthy. So for convenience I have put chapter XVI in six different posts.

Next,
Chapter XVI (312-318) of IPC – Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to Unborn Children, of the Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births

Chapter XVI (319-338) of IPC – Hurt

Chapter XVI (339-358) of IPC – Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement

Chapter XVI (359-374) of IPC – Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour

Chapter XVI (375-377) of IPC – Sexual Offences (Rape)